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de Informações Sociais,
Econômicas e Territoriais

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Uma das maneiras de olhar o ofício de produzir informações sociais, econômicas e territoriais é como arte de descrever o mundo. Estatísticas e mapas transportam os fenômenos da realidade para escalas apropriadas à perspectiva de nossa visão humana e nos permitem pensar e agir à distância, construindo avenidas de mão dupla que juntam o mundo e suas imagens. Maior o poder de síntese dessas representações, combinando, com precisão, elementos dispersos e heterogêneos do cotidiano, maior o nosso conhecimento e a nossa capacidade de compreender e transformar a realidade.

Visto como arte, o ofício de produzir essas informações reflete a cultura de um País e de sua época, como essa cultura vê o mundo e o torna visível, redefinindo o que vê e o que há para se ver.

No cenário de contínua inovação tecnológica e mudança de culturas da sociedade contemporânea, as novas tecnologias de informação - reunindo computadores, telecomunicações e redes de informação - aceleram aquele movimento de mobilização do mundo real. Aumenta a velocidade da acumulação de informação e são ampliados seus requisitos de atualização, formato - mais flexível, personalizado e interativo - e, principalmente, de acessibilidade. A plataforma digital vem se consolidando como o meio mais simples, barato e poderoso para tratar a informação, tornando possíveis novos produtos e serviços e conquistando novos usuários.

Acreditamos ser o ambiente de conversa e controvérsia e de troca entre as diferentes disciplinas, nas mesas redondas e sessões temáticas das Conferências Nacionais de Geografia, Cartografia e Estatística e do Simpósio de Inovações, aquele que melhor ensaja o aprimoramento do consenso sobre os fenômenos a serem mensurados para retratar a sociedade, a economia e o território nacional e sobre as prioridades e formatos das informações necessárias para o fortalecimento da cidadania, a definição de políticas públicas e a gestão político - administrativa do País, e para criar uma sociedade mais justa.

Simon Schwartzman
Coordenador Geral do ENCONTRO

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Registramos ainda a colaboração de técnicos das diferentes
áreas do IBGE, com seu trabalho, críticas e sugestões para a
consolidação do projeto do ENCONTRO.

Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress

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Why is Brazil's legislature extraordinarily active in the distribution of pork barrel but largely inactive on national issues? This article explores the question by illuminating the motivations of congressional deputies. Emphasizing the effects of open-list proportional representation and executive dominance over resources, I develop a model of legislative voting based on the operation of Brazil's political institutions. The nature of deputies' electoral bases, especially the clustering of their support and their domination of local constituencies, constrain deputies' preferences. Ideological positions matter as well, but the socioeconomic characteristics of constituencies only weakly affect legislative voting. Pork-barrel programs controlled by the president also profoundly influence deputies' broader voting patterns. When the motivations of deputies favor deals maximizing local pork barrel and discourage strengthening parties and responding to broader constituency demands, it is no surprise that the legislature devotes little attention to national issues.

"Balanced budgets are the rhetoric of incompetent politicians"
—Orestes Quêrcia, ex-governor of São Paulo.¹

Ideally, the study of legislatures in formerly authoritarian regimes should be comparative, linking variations in public policy to variations in electoral systems, legislative preferences, internal rules, and executive-legislative relations. Though a growing body of descriptive literature is beginning to supply cross-nationally valid indicators for these concepts, we still need empirical work based on single-country studies, studies informed in part by existing comparative research and in part by the theoretical and empirical American literature.²

This article explores the motivations of members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Brazilian Congress. By motivations I mean ideology, constituency characteris-

This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, Washington University, St. Louis, and IRIS—Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, at the University of Maryland, College Park.

¹Ciro Gomes, the current governor of Ceará, claims that Quêrcia made this remark. The Portuguese is better: "Equilíbrio financeiro é conversa de político incompetente" (*Veja* 1992, 9).

²Some scholars offer comparisons of two or three countries as the best solution to this problem. I believe that most small sample comparisons really hold very little constant and serve merely as cover for superficial empirical work.

tics, electoral prospects, and susceptibility to pork-barrel inducements. My objective is to develop and evaluate an argument linking these forces to voting in Brazil's National Constituent Assembly (ANC) of 1987–1988 and in the administration of President Fernando Collor de Mello.

The article proceeds in four sections. Section I examines the overall performance of the Brazilian legislature. Section II sketches a theory of legislative voting based on the nature of Brazil's political institutions, with emphasis on the electoral system. Section III presents and evaluates a model of voting in the ANC and on a set of emergency presidential decrees in 1990. Section IV discusses the implications of the empirical findings.

HOW WELL DO BRAZIL'S DECISION-MAKING INSTITUTIONS WORK?

Both in the current democratic experiment and in the 1946–1964 period, the Brazilian Congress has seldom been able to legislate on issues of national concern.³ The legislature's weakness was especially visible in 1987–1988, when the Senate and the Chamber joined together as the constituent assembly. A 160-page constitution emerged, a constitution that placed ceilings on interest rates and granted life tenure to bureaucrats but left major issues in health care and education for future legislatures. The subsequent Congress, to no one's surprise, resolved nothing, doing little more than reacting to President Collor's many emergency decrees and, ultimately, impeaching the president himself.

Why is the legislature so inactive on substantive policy questions? Actually, a comparison of Brazil's institutions with those of other nations might lead to just the opposite expectation. The system is presidential, with an open and decentralized executive; the electoral system is candidate-centered and decentralized; interest groups are functionally specialized; parties are numerous, weakly organized, internally fragmented, and autonomous from external control; permanent committees parallel the structure of administrative agencies. In a recent comparative project, Michael Mezey found all these characteristics linked to *greater* legislative activity (Olsen and Mezey 1991, 201–14).⁴

The policy weakness of Brazil's legislature has three possible causes. The number of parties may have reached a level discouraging policy activity. The legislature's procedural rules could hinder policy making, either deliberately or through consequences no one anticipated. And finally, deputies may deliberately avoid serious policy making, either because their primary interests lie in pork barrel or because their preference for nonprogrammatic parties leads to a legislature unable to

³Some analysts attempting to explain the military coup of 1964, notably dos Santos (1979), have stressed the legislative immobility of the Congress at the end of the earlier pluralist period, but research on congressional elections or congressional behavior during the 1946–1964 democratic period is scarce. See, however, Benevides (1976, 1981, 1982), Soares (1973), and Souza (1976). On the current Congress, see Figueiredo and Limongi (1994) and Novaes (1994).

⁴Mezey notes, however, that in two important cases weak parties led to greater activity but not

aggregate societal demands. It is this third cause, the question of motivation, on which my inquiry focuses.

TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING

I begin with a description of the electoral system and a typology of the spatial distribution of deputies' voting support. Next, I treat the factors motivating vote choices. After linking each factor to indicators tapping an underlying issue dimension, I evaluate the model in a multiple-regression framework.⁵

*The Brazilian Electoral System*⁶

Brazil's federal deputies are elected through a system of open-list proportional representation. Each state is a single, at-large, multimember district.⁷ Seats per state range from eight to 70, with small states overrepresented and large states, principally São Paulo, underrepresented. State parties—states being meaningful arenas of political conflict—select candidates in conventions, but parties cannot refuse to renominate incumbents. Voters may cast their single ballots either for the party label—in which case their votes merely add to the party's total—or for individual candidates. Most opt for an individual. Candidate names appear nowhere on the ballot; instead, the voter writes in the candidate's name or number. The D'Hondt method determines how many seats each party earns; the individual ordering of votes then establishes which candidates receive these seats.

Legally, candidates may seek votes everywhere in their states, but in reality many concentrate their campaigns geographically, finding most of their support in one or more contiguous regions, regions popularly referred to as "electoral strongholds" (*redutos eleitorais*). Why concentrate in a specific area? For diverse reasons: the candidates' families have long held power in the region; a party leader sent them to the area; they appeal to its voters; they make a deal with a local political leader. Whatever the roots of local dominance, other aspirants from the same party, and perhaps other parties as well, avoid that fortress.

Are there modal patterns of spatial support?⁸ Two dimensions characterize spatial performance at the state level. First, for every deputy in each municipality, consider V_{ix} , deputy i 's share of all the votes cast in municipality x . These shares

⁵I make no claim to have derived all these hypotheses deductively. They come, rather, from the formal literature on legislative behavior, from interviews with deputies and staff, from observation of campaign and legislative behavior, and from analysis of committee and floor amendments. Needless to say, there is very little research on legislatures in electoral systems like that of Brazil to draw on.

⁶For a more extensive treatment of the electoral system, particularly the campaign strategies of deputies, see my "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation" (1995).


⁷State assembly members are elected in the same districts as Federal deputies. Thus, they are all elected at large. Some extraordinary cross-campaign alliances result.

⁸Since each state is a single at-large electoral district, any taxonomy of spatial support must characterize voting patterns at the level of the whole state. And because individual results vary so markedly across municipalities, the taxonomy should be based on electoral results in the particular municipalities furnishing the bulk of a deputy's support.

FIGURE 1

THE CONCENTRATED-DOMINANT VOTE OF A LOCAL POLITICIAN

Municipal Vote Share of Said Ferreira, PMDB—Paraná




represent the deputies' dominance at the municipal level. Now use V_{ix} to calculate D_i , the average level of dominance for each deputy across all the municipalities of the state, weighted by the percentage of the deputy's total vote each municipality contributes. Deputies with higher weighted averages tend to "dominate" their key municipalities; those with lower weighted averages "share" these municipalities with other deputies. Thus, "dominance-sharedness" is the first dimension of spatial support. The second dimension also begins with V_{ix} , the deputy's share of the total municipal vote. Now, however, consider the spatial distribution of those municipalities where the deputy does well. These municipalities can be concentrated, as close or contiguous neighbors, or they can be scattered. Combining the two dimensions yields four spatial patterns, as illustrated in figure 1 through figure 4.

1. *Concentrated-Dominated Municipalities.* In the classic Brazilian "*reduto*" (bailiwick); a deputy dominates a group of contiguous municipalities. Typically, such *redutos* are based on the deputy's local reputation or family tradition. Figure 1, for example, reflects the "friends and neighbors" quality of the votes garnered by a

FIGURE 2

THE CONCENTRATED-SHARED VOTE OF AN ENVIRONMENTALIST

Personal and Municipal Shares of Fábio Feldmann, PSDB—São Paulo



first-time candidate who had been mayor of a large town in the center of the vote cluster.

2. *Concentrated-shared Municipalities.* Some deputies specialize in a particular voter cohort, e.g., industrial workers, a cohort strong in contiguous municipalities. In heavily industrialized areas such as greater São Paulo, workers are so numerous that their votes elect many deputies. A deputy in São Paulo might also occupy an ideological space. In figure 2, a deputy stressing "green" issues gets two-thirds of his vote in the city of São Paulo, but his share of the municipality's total vote is less than 3%. Only on a small island, where environmental issues are salient, is his municipal share greater than 10%.


3. *Scattered-shared Municipalities.* Deputies can appeal to voter cohorts that are quite cohesive but numerically weak in any single municipality. This type includes Japanese-Brazilians (important in São Paulo and Paraná) and, as figure 3 reveals, *evangélicos*, Brazilian Protestants who typically vote for evangelical candidates.

4. *Scattered-dominated Municipalities.* Some deputies seek out local leaders willing to trade blocs of votes for pork. This pattern is also characteristic of deputies who once held state-level bureaucratic jobs (such as state secretary of education), jobs with the power to distribute geographically separable goods. Figure 4 represents a deputy with considerable deal-making skills.

FIGURE 3

THE SCATTERED-SHARED VOTE OF AN EVANGELICAL

Municipal Vote Share of Matheus Iensen, PTB—Paraná

*The Distribution and Evolution of Spatial Patterns*


Regional and temporal variations are quite pronounced. "Dominant" deputies are more common in the traditional Northeast, where boss rule, especially in rural areas, continues. Deputies in the South and Southeast usually confront candidates of other parties, and sometimes they battle candidates of their own party, even in rural municipalities. Deputies from the more developed South and Southeast, however, have more *concentrated* votes. Indeed, the most concentrated distributions are found in Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Minas Gerais, and Santa Catarina.⁹ Candidates in these states often win election with little or no support in their states' capitals, and their political careers typically begin in local politics rather than in business or the bureaucracy. When they dominate the party vote in their areas of

⁹I calculated a measure of spatial autocorrelation (Moran's I) for every candidate in congressional elections from 1978 to 1990. The ranking of states according to the concentration of vote distributions is based on the average of successful candidates from 1978–1990.

FIGURE 4

A SCATTERED-DOMINANT VOTE DISTRIBUTION

Municipal Vote Share of Jonival Lucas, PDC—Bahia



strength, they may be more accountable to local voters, but they are also highly motivated to attract public works projects (Novaes 1994).

Spatial patterns have changed significantly over the last four elections (1978–1990). Though the Northeast still has the highest average level of dominance, it has decreased everywhere, and few deputies enjoy unchallenged preserves of voters. Concentration, on the other hand, has grown, with the greatest increases coming in the states that once were the most scattered. These increases in concentration make more deputies accountable to local communities, but—as the 72,000 budget amendments demonstrate—they also increase deputies' eagerness for pork-barrel projects.

Final Details. Before turning to specific determinants of legislative voting, let us highlight three pieces of the puzzle: party fragmentation and coherence, turnover, and campaign expenditures. Given open-list PR, high district magnitudes, and the absence of a meaningful threshold for attaining seats, it is no surprise that well over

a dozen parties elect deputies. Most have only minimal programs, and few have much influence over their members.¹⁰

Turnover is very high. In 1990 only about 40% of the incumbent deputies were reelected for the 1991–1994 term. Of the 60% not returning, about half retired or stood for other offices and half were defeated. Turnover rates from both retirement and defeat are highest in the developed South and Southeast. Their delegations, as a result, typically have less experience. Why so much turnover? Because mayors have more control over programs and do not have to live in Brasília, many deputies opt for executive offices. Other deputies switch to bureaucratic jobs as a way of fattening their clienteles before returning to elective office. Brazil's high turnover rates raise a warning flag against the facile assumption (which in part comes from the astonishing stability of the U.S. House) that reelection is the primary goal of elected politicians. For many Brazilian deputies, especially those from poor regions, politics is a business.¹¹ Because politicians seek to maximize income over a whole career, they may choose to leave the Chamber, pursuing other avenues of mobility, only to return later. Expectations of short careers discourage investment in legislative expertise and encourage concentration on pork. In addition, Brazilian deputies prefer weak parties, i.e., parties unable to impose discipline or minimal programs (Novaes 1994).

In large constituencies with fluid bailiwicks, substantial campaign expenditures are the norm. Well-informed observers estimate that in 1990 the average successful candidate spent over US \$1 million.¹² Since TV and radio time are free, the bulk of campaign spending goes to rallies, campaign literature, automobiles, and bribes for local bosses. Most of the money is raised from corporate sources contributing through their "*caixa dois*," their hidden accounts. Although the most varied corporations contribute to congressional candidates (including multinationals like Mercedes-Benz), the biggest contributors are probably large construction companies, the *empreiteiras*. Dependent on government projects for their very existence, the *empreiteiras* expect their deputies to pressure ministers to liberate previously authorized funds and to sponsor amendments and bills yielding lucrative contracts.

VOTING IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ON COLLOR'S EMERGENCY DECREES

Measuring Voting Preferences

Although the legislature's inactivity and its reluctance to record votes hinders roll-call analysis, two sets of votes are available. The first comes from the Constituent

¹⁰Parties cannot legally prevent their deputies from changing parties during legislative sessions, and almost 40% of the members of the 1986–1990 Chamber actually did change parties.

¹¹In some regions politics is a *family* business. In Bahia 40% of the deputies have a relative (of the same generation or older) holding political office. In São Paulo only 5% come from political families.

¹²Personal communication with David Fleischer.

Assembly of 1987–1988.¹³ Kinzo (1989) fashioned a series of issue scales from key votes in the ANC. I selected four scales as indicators of basic dimensions of voting.¹⁴ The four scales include “support for expanded congressional prerogatives,” “support for expanded executive authority,” “statism-welfarism,” and “support for popular democracy.” The second set of votes comes from the same legislature. When Fernando Collor de Mello assumed power in early 1990, Brazil’s economy teetered at the edge of hyperinflation. In short order Collor promulgated a series of draconian measures. The most significant and controversial decrees reformed the structure of central government ministries, fixed prices and salaries, established a privatization program, regulated the conduct of civil servants, altered business taxes, eliminated fiscal subsidies, and—the most dramatic of all—sequestered private financial assets. Collor’s decrees went to the legislature as “*medidas provisórias*,” emergency measures. Though the decrees became law immediately, they would become null if the legislature failed to approve them within a set time period. Given that the president’s party had few congressional seats, passage depended on the persuasive power of Collor and his legislative allies.

Explanatory Variables

Dominance and Clustering. How should the spatial distribution of electoral support, i.e., dominance and clustering, influence deputies’ voting? Remember, dominant deputies are mostly found in less developed, more rural areas. If we hold the wealth of constituencies constant, we should find that deputies dominating their core municipalities oppose state economic intervention and short-term welfare measures. Dominance is impossible without the backing of a community’s economic elite, and local elites rarely support agrarian reform or expanded workers’

¹³The Chamber and Senate met each morning as the ANC, then separated each afternoon to conduct normal legislative business. In all, the ANC held 1,021 votes. In 550 the losing side cast at least 50 votes. Timothy Power and I constructed an archive with all the contested votes of the ANC. Scholars interested in the archive should contact Power at Louisiana State University.

¹⁴From Kinzo’s (1989) discussion it is unclear whether the groups of votes are true scales or merely indices. I applied standard scale tests (with the help of David Nixon), retaining only those votes meeting scaling criteria. Logit analyses of individual votes are generally consistent with regressions based on the multivariate scales, but these scales are preferable because they minimize the effects of absentee voting and other peculiarities specific to particular votes. I call Kinzo’s “Economic Conservatism” scale “Statism-welfarism” because the items really measure willingness to support government intervention in the economy and defense of issues championed by unions. I have renamed her “Support for Democratic Values” scale “Support for Popular Democracy” because a number of its items facilitate class-action lawsuits and direct democracy, while others hinder military intervention. The Congressional Power Scale includes nine items, with a typical item requiring the Congress to approve the federal budget. The Support for Executive scale includes five items; a typical item gave future presidents a five-year mandate. The State Economic Intervention-Welfarism scale included six items; a typical item dealt with indemnities paid to workers fired unfairly by employers. The Support for Popular Democracy Scale included six items; a typical item permitted class action suits. The index of President Collor’s Emergency Decrees included eight items, the most important of which allowed the government to confiscate, for 18 months, a substantial part of private savings. Further information about the scales is available on request from the author.

rights. Dominant deputies should also uphold executive power. As dominance increases, deputies are better able to “claim credit” for the pork they deliver, so they work harder at bringing pork home (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Because in Brazil the executive controls most pork-barrel programs, good relations with the president are a must. Moreover, dominant deputies tend to be more senior, so they are around long enough to develop good relations. Finally, dominant deputies should be reluctant to expand congressional authority, because increases in the prerogatives of the Congress would weaken the monopoly on access enjoyed by the old guard.

Clustered votes make deputies more accountable to voters and less responsive to local or regional bosses. Face-to-face contact in clustered constituencies is greater, community organizations participate in campaigns, and deputies’ careers are more likely to be rooted in their core regions. Accountability makes deputies more likely to promote a legislative agenda; hence, they seek expanded congressional power. Greater accountability, however, also encourages deputies to maximize pork, and since the executive plays a central role in pork distribution, we might expect clustered deputies to support expanded executive power. In the South, however, public attitudes were so hostile to President Sarney that deputies were likely to seek reduced executive authority, even though they might individually try to maintain links to the president. Clustered vote bases should produce deputies with a populist bent; hence they will tend toward economic interventionism and favor the demands of organized labor. Finally, support for popular democracy is likely to be higher among clustered-vote deputies because they rarely depend on deals with local elites.

Constituency Attributes. Wealth and industrial development are so highly correlated that we seek only the overall relationship between these indicators and voting. In the political context of the late 1980s, deputies relying on industrial voters should be pro-Congress, anti-executive, and statist-welfarist on economic issues. At the same time, the control exerted by constituencies over deputies should depend not merely on the wealth and industrial level of a deputy’s voters; it should also depend on the constituency’s *homogeneity*. Imagine two constituencies with the same mean level of income or industrialization. In one, most municipalities are near the mean on these characteristics; in the other, the communities are more diverse. In the more homogeneous constituency, voters’ interests are clearer because the municipalities are similar; in a heterogeneous constituency interests are diverse and conflictual.¹⁵

To test the relationship between constituency wealth, the cross-municipal variation of wealth, and voting behavior, I created dummy variables for deputies with

¹⁵Per capita income is a reasonable indicator of the economic development of an areal unit, but the concept is more difficult to operationalize when actual voters, rather than a fixed district, define a constituency. I define the per capita income of a given deputy’s voters as the average per capita income of the municipalities in which the deputy received votes, weighted by the percentage of the deputy’s total vote received in each municipality. The homogeneity of the constituency is defined as the coefficient of

constituencies of high, medium, and low heterogeneity. I then multiplied these dummies by the measure of wealth. The regression results show the effects of wealth in each range of heterogeneity.

Career Path. Though many paths lead to the Chamber, they can be roughly grouped into three modal career trajectories: local, business, and bureaucratic. "Local" deputies are those who served as mayors or on municipal councils in one of their two jobs prior to the Chamber of Deputies. A "business" career means the deputy acted primarily in the private sector. "Bureaucratic" deputies held high-level jobs in state or federal agencies. On the basis of extensive conversations with Brazilian informants (journalists, academics, and deputies), I expect business types to differ fundamentally from other kinds of deputies. Many business types see their activities in the Chamber as an extension of their personal economic interests. When deputies lobby for privately run hospitals, the construction industry, or poultry processors, they are not merely representing important constituents—indeed, the economic interest may hardly function in their districts. Instead, such "corporatist" deputies represent their *personal* interests.¹⁶ Obviously not all business deputies embody a corporatist representational style, but they adopt it more often than deputies with local or bureaucratic backgrounds. Given both the weakness of the legislature and the strong regulatory power of the executive and bureaucracy, business deputies should be antilegislature and proexecutive. Their economic attitudes, given their position as private-sector employers, should be antistatist and antiwelfarist. Their support for popular democracy is likely to be low because many of the scale's items involve antibusiness mobilization.

Another path marks one of the legislature's most notorious factions, the roughly 40 Protestant ministers called *evangélicos*. They were widely seen as quite pork oriented, willing to grant the executive practically anything in exchange for public works benefitting their religious ministries.

Seniority and Electoral Insecurity. In a legislature with high turnover, few deputies have much seniority. The Chamber's rules, in addition, barely reward seniority. Committee chairs retain their positions for only two years, senior deputies have no additional staff allowance, and the dominance of party proportionality as a criterion for committee appointment (coupled with the large number of parties) gives senior members little advantage. But senior deputies have time and motivation to establish close ties with ministries supplying constituency-specific goods. They are also frequent occupants of ministerial positions, so they are likely to be pro-executive. Because a more powerful legislature would benefit newer deputies, senior members are unlikely to support expanded congressional prerogatives.

In an open-list proportional system, all deputies know how close they were to defeat in the last election. The further from the top of the party's postelection list, the weaker the deputy. Low-ranking deputies are particularly vulnerable to execu-

¹⁶Henry Jackson was often called the "Senator from Boeing," but the label referred to the importance of Boeing to his home state, not to personal business interests.

tive pressure because the president controls the pork that might bring a few more votes at the next election.

State Unity and State Interests. A state's deputies will vote as a bloc when they have a common interest or when a state leader demands unity. Do states have common interests on constitutional issues and presidential decrees? On economic and social issues some delegations may be predominantly populist or neoliberal, but such positions represent voter preferences, not geographical interests. States in the North and Northeast, however, hold more congressional seats than their populations merit and receive a disproportionate share of pork, so their deputies ought to support expanded congressional prerogatives. But because these same deputies tend to be quite senior, they profit from close ties to a strong executive. Overall, then, constituency issues are too diffuse to incline state delegations in any particular direction. At the same time, state politics matters in Brazil, and in some states strong governors lead powerful machines. These "caciques" may have little to gain or lose on constitutional issues, but their influence grows if they can deliver blocs of deputies. On the president's emergency measures the votes of delegations depend on state economic interests and, once again, on the political interests of governors. Given these multiple constraints, firm convictions as to the strength or effects of state unity are impossible, but I explore the issue by including dummy variables for the dominant parties of two states, Bahia and Maranhão, both known for their strong state machines.

Political Party. When political parties are stable and disciplined, we confidently predict voting behavior on the basis of party affiliations. Brazilian parties are so weak, however, that deputies jump ship with absolute impunity, even in the middle of legislative sessions. Between 1987 and 1990, for example, 40% of all deputies changed parties, mostly during the Constituent Assembly. Whether deputies switched for electoral or ideological reasons, the implications are the same: party in the long term is *endogenous*. Rather than a *determinant* of issue positions and electoral tactics, party is a *consequence*.

If party affiliations are useless as explanatory variables during a time of party switching, can we still measure ideological position? One possibility is the deputy's party *during the military regime*. Until 1982 the right-wing military regime allowed only two parties. The National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) supported the government; the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) opposed it. After 1982 ARENA became the Democratic Social Party (PDS), but former ARENA members constitute the most conservative elements in almost every party (Power 1993, 86–93). I expect former *Arenistas* to be pro-executive and anti-Congress, opposed to state intervention and the demands of organized labor, and (given their role in the military regime) less supportive of popular democracy.

By the time the Chamber voted on Collor's emergency decrees, party membership had stabilized. Now we can more confidently utilize party as an explanatory variable. The Workers' Party (PT) and the Democratic Workers' Party (PDT)

opposed Collor, the PDS and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) supported him, the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), and the clientelistic Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) divided.

The Pork Barrel. In a single-member system, all deputies should be equally interested in pork-barrel projects because all are able to claim credit for the projects built in their districts. In multimember constituencies, the ability to claim credit decreases as the number of vote-getting deputies increases. Brazil's left-leaning deputies often share working-class constituencies where credit claiming is impossible and where national economic issues take precedence over public works. Thus, in the long run, pork-oriented deputies tend to be antilabor and proexecutive. In the short run the executive may offer specific inducements to attract deputies. President Sarney, for example, utilized pork to recruit deputies on key constitutional issues, including a five-year term for himself and for future presidents, and presidentialism over parliamentarism. Collor claimed to be above such "politics," but the revelations surrounding his impeachment indicate that his administration reached new depths in corruption.

Fortunately, success in attracting pork is measurable. "Pork Payoff to Municipality" is the probability that a deputy could claim credit for an intergovernmental transfer made in 1988 to municipalities where that deputy received votes.¹⁷ "Pork Payoff to Deputy" refers to a 1988 social assistance program of the Ministry of Planning (SEPLAN). Specific deputies sponsored the program in each municipality. "Radio and TV License" calculates the probability that the ministry of Communications granted a concession during the ANC to a municipality in which the deputy had an electoral base.¹⁸ Finally, "Ministerial Request" indicates that sometime in 1990 the deputy met with the ministers of Infrastructure, Agriculture, Education, or Social Action. These meetings were not about the weather.¹⁹

¹⁷Municipalities, not deputies, receive intergovernmental transfers. If a deputy wins all the votes in a municipality, then clearly that deputy gets all the credit. Suppose, however, a group of deputies shares a municipality's votes. Do all deputies claim credit equally? Do they divide the credit in proportion to their vote shares? Does the leading vote getter get all the credit? Does the credit go to deputies from the president's party, or is it divided in terms of party vote shares? Most informants believed that either the leading vote getter of any party or of the president's party would get the pork. I tried various formulations, achieving the best results by assuming that only the leading candidate in a given municipality could claim credit, but that leader could be of any party.

If a deputy received credit for pork in a municipality contributing only a minute fraction of the deputy's total statewide vote, the credit would do little electorally. In aggregating the individual municipal probabilities, I therefore weighted each municipality's probability by the fraction of the deputy's total vote the municipality contributed. In effect, the indicator measures the probability that someone voting for deputy *x* actually benefitted from an intergovernmental transfer. The precise period of pork delivery, May–June 1988, corresponds exactly to President Sarney's campaign for a five-year term and for presidentialism. Longer periods produced weaker but similar results.

¹⁸The calculation was analogous to the "Pork Payoff to Municipality" variable. I adjusted the probability where I knew a particular deputy owned the radio or TV station.

¹⁹The parliamentary liaisons of these ministries maintain lists of deputies meeting with ministers.

TABLE 1
OLS ESTIMATES FOR VOTING IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Independent Variables	Congressional Power	Support for Executive	Statism-Welfarism	Support for Popular Democracy
Constant	-.176**	.136*	.113	-.076
Municipal dominance	-.110**	.131**	-.037	.002
Clustering in South	.019**	-.024**	.015*	.008
Clustering outside South	.029**	-.009	.025*	.024*
Wealth × High variance	.035	.146	.101	.232
Wealth × Medium variance	.061	-.115**	.091	.104*
Wealth × Low variance	.104	-.061	.090	-.027
Local career	.033	-.001	.052	-.002
Business career	-.112**	.146**	-.143**	-.158**
Bureaucratic career	-.059	.044	-.046	-.034
Evangelical	-.204**	.194**	-.095**	-.126**
Terms in office	-.037	.045	.007	-.029
Rank in party list	-.005	.113**	.004	.003
Bahia × PFL	-.108**	.087**	-.130**	-.162**
Bahia × PMDB	.103**	-.149**	.116**	.071
Maranhão × PFL	-.028	.076**	-.043	-.032
Maranhão × PMDB	-.011	.036	.027	-.003
ARENA	-.304**	.190**	-.342**	-.266**
Pork to municipality	-.104**	.059	-.070	-.119**
Ministerial audience	-.156**	.145**	-.193**	-.182**
Radio-TV license	-.065*	.079**	-.097**	-.141**
Pork to deputy	-.142**	.215**	-.122**	-.095*
R ² =	.34	.38	.24	.18
R ² without pork variables =	.17	.28	.24	.18
F =	9.25	10.89	8.87	6.63
N =	403	403	403	403

Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

* $p < .10$, two-tailed test; ** $p < .05$, two-tailed test.

Results

Table 1 presents the model's results for four basic dimensions of voting in the ANC. Consider first the results for dominance, clustering, and constituency income. Deputies dominating their vote bases were more likely to back the executive and less likely to support congressional prerogatives. Dominance was unrelated, however, to statism-welfarism or support for popular democracy. Dominance does not, therefore, simply predict deputies' Left-Right positions. Rather, it leads to a purely "political" tactic: stay close to the executive and minimize support for a Congress whose structure already affords privileged access to dominant deputies (Novaes 1994).

Vote clustering produced effects that support and amplify our expectations.

congressional power and statist-welfarist issues. But clustering led to antiexecutive positions only in the South, and it led to more support for popular democracy only outside the South. These regional differences come from context: outside the South support for a strong executive is widespread, and even clustered deputies succumb to executive pressure. At the same time, oligarchical rule is still prevalent outside the South, so only when deputies cluster do we find the responsiveness to voters that leads to support for mass, democratic politics.

Wealth and industry had the expected effects—antiexecutive, economically statist-welfarist, supportive of popular democracy—but only in constituencies of moderate heterogeneity. In other words, increasing wealth failed to affect voting precisely where I expected the strongest effects, i.e., in the most uniform constituencies. Why? Uniform constituencies, it seems, tend to fall into two groups. One group includes deputies picking up nearly all their votes in big cities and industrial suburbs. Such deputies have shared-concentrated constituencies, and they mostly vote left: antiexecutive, welfarist, etc. The other cluster includes deputies constructing constituencies by making deals with local bosses, typically in a scattered-dominated pattern. Such deputies usually vote on the right, the opposite of their big city colleagues. These groups tend to cancel each other: wealthy big cities, especially São Paulo, are more industrial and hence more supportive of PT candidates; wealthy scattered municipalities are likely to be agricultural and more conservative.

The career variables confirmed the informal observations of deputies and journalists: politicians with business backgrounds supported executive power, opposed congressional influence, and opposed labor's economic demands. They also oppose—perhaps in defense of their economic interests—popular democracy. Bureaucrats and local politicians manifested no tendencies at all.²⁰ Evangelicals, as expected were proexecutive, anti-Congress, antilabor, and antidemocratic.

How important were seniority and electoral insecurity? Many of the most senior deputies had served in the Congress during the period of military rule. Their votes are indistinguishable from junior deputies on economic and popular democracy issues, and they are weakly but positively supportive of executive power. It is striking that the Congress' most senior deputies *oppose* increasing congressional influence over policy. Electoral insecurity influenced only one of the issue scales, but that linkage is critical: because the executive controls crucial electoral resources, weak deputies are proexecutive.

Strong state leaders matter politically. Some governors polarize their delegations. The single most dominant state-level organization, the Liberal Front Party of Bahia's Antonio Carlos Magalhães, exercised considerable power over its deputies: PFL deputies in Bahia stand out as a coherent bloc. But Bahia's PMDB deputies emerge as a vigorously *opposing* bloc. Thus, the "extra" right-wing Bahian PFL is matched by an "extra" left-wing PMDB. In Maranhão, the Sarney organi-

zation, even with its chief in the presidency, unified only on the key issue of executive power. On that issue the PMDB was almost as proexecutive as Sarney's PFL. Thus, Brazil's folk wisdom is right: ACM polarized politicians; Sarney reconciled them.

Former members of the promilitary ARENA Party behaved as predicted: proexecutive, anti-Congress, opposed to labor's economic demands, and low on popular democracy. Essentially, the ARENA variable measures long-term ideological predispositions. While many former *Arenistas* have moved into centrist or even mildly leftist parties—maximizing electorability—their positions remain obdurately conservative.

Finally, consider the effects of pork. Overall, deputies receiving pork benefits voted to weaken the legislature and strengthen the executive, and they tended to oppose statism-welfarism and popular democracy. Though a few coefficients are insignificant, the directions are always correct, and the insignificant cases occur on the fuzziest indicator, i.e., where it was difficult to identify the deputy benefitting from a public works project. Moreover, without the pork variables the model's R^2 declines by an average of 28%. In sum, *pork buys deputies*.

In table 2 the model is applied to deputies' support (high scores representing support for the president) for the eight emergency measures. Though broadly

TABLE 2
OLS ESTIMATES OF DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT
FOR COLLOR'S EMERGENCY DECREES

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate
Constant	-.080	PDT	-.166**
Dominance × PFL-PDS	-.073**	PT	-.235**
Dominance × PMDB	.080**	PFL	.046
Clustering in South	-.003	PDS	.120*
Clustering outside South	.078	PMDB	-.301**
Wealth × High variance	.057	Congressional power	.009
Wealth × Medium variance	-.117**	Support for executive	.117**
Wealth × Low variance	-.040	Statism-Welfarism	.127**
Business career	.048	Popular democracy	-.023
Bureaucratic career	.014	Pork to municipality	-.021
Evangelical	.080**	Ministerial audience	.125**
Terms in office	-.027	Radio-TV license	.055
Rank in party list	-.014	Pork to deputy	.008
Bahia × PFL	.011		
Bahia × PMDB	.008		
Maranhão × PFL	.008		
Maranhão × PMDB	.015		
ARENA	.207**		
		$R^2 = .56$	
		R^2 without pork variables = .52	
		$F = 14.62$	
		$N = 379$	

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

* $p < .10$, two-tailed test; ** $p < .05$, two-tailed test.

²⁰The absence of differences for bureaucratic deputies contradicts Power (1993), who found a strong executive orientation.

similar to the ANC model, the regression includes a number of important modifications. First, issue positions—the object of explanation in the first model—become explanatory variables. Second, the model categorizes deputies both by their actual parties and by their previous affiliation (if any) with ARENA. Why suddenly add current parties to the model? By 1990 the party switching of the ANC period had settled down; party now could really mean something. Adding parties also allows us to measure dominance separately for deputies from the right-wing PFL and PDS and from the centrist PMDB. With these two dummies we can examine the hypothesis that dominance gives deputies autonomy from party leaders.

Both vote distribution and constituency wealth continue to influence voting. Dominant PFL and PDS deputies opposed the president. Remember that the PFL as a whole neither backed nor opposed the president, and the PDS supported him only weakly. Dominant PMDB deputies also dissented from their party—they backed the president while the party as a whole opposed him. Thus, in both cases, *dominance facilitated autonomy*. In an open-list system, it is easy to see why dominance frees deputies, but why should autonomous deputies *want* to oppose their party leaders? PDS-PFL defectors tend to be located in states where most deputies opposed the president, and PMDB defectors are mostly in supportive states, so perhaps we are witnessing a movement toward the center of the state political context.

Constituency wealth affects voting behavior only for deputies whose vote bases are moderately heterogeneous. The cancelling effects of the two kinds of low-variance constituencies—scattered rural municipalities and concentrated big city bases—again seems the most likely explanation.

The only personal characteristic affecting support for the emergency decrees is “Evangelical Background.” Ex-Protestant ministers supported the president more than deputies with other backgrounds. Seniority and electoral weakness had no effect.

Do powerful governors influence their deputies? Once again, the model estimates the strength of Antonio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) and José Sarney. In neither case did the deputies stand out in their voting behavior. This result differs from our ANC model, where the Bahian governor polarized his delegation. The difference, I suggest, stems from nature of the two kinds of votes. In the Assembly, deputies resolved questions of long-term ideological significance. On the emergency measures, they decided immediate pocketbook issues. Economic interests, especially state interests, overwhelmed ideological disputes. ACM remains a mighty force in national-level politics, but the emergency measures affected him little, so his delegates voted along other criteria.

Ideology and party count independently. Proexecutive, antilegislation, anti-labor deputies supported the president. Members of the Workers’ Party (PT) and Brizola’s PDT opposed Collor, while PDS and PFL members were supportive. The centrist PMDB and the highly clientelistic Brazilian Workers’ Party (PTB) fell in the middle. Previous affiliation with ARENA contributed inde-

result is important: in spite of their fragmentation and incoherence, parties still matter in the legislature.

Finally, one pork measure strongly influenced presidential support. Deputies meeting with ministers ended up voting with the president. Of our four indicators of pork barrel, this was the sharpest, since the identity of the deputy benefitted is unambiguous. We have reaffirmed, therefore, the strength of the pork-presidential support linkage.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This article began with a puzzle. Brazil’s legislature ought to be active. The system is presidential; the electoral system is decentralized and candidate-centered; interest groups are well organized and functionally specific; the executive is relatively open; permanent committees parallel the structure of the executive; parties are numerous. Such conditions all imply a busy legislature, and indeed, in the budgetary process the legislature is quite active. But on issues of national scope Brazil’s Congress accomplished little.

Legislative weakness can have three causes: excessive parties, procedural roadblocks, and an excess of members with little interest in broad legislation. The party system merits investigation, but fewer parties participated in the equally unsuccessful democracy of 1946–1964. Moreover, it is unclear how many parties qualify as “dangerous excess.” Procedures also matter, but given that few deputies develop much seniority, the costs of removing procedural obstacles should be low. Thus, I focus on motivations. What mix of constituency pressures, ideology, electoral needs, and local interests determines voting patterns?

I examined the motivations of deputies by modeling two kinds of voting: broad issue areas in the Constituent Assembly of 1987–1988 and Collor’s emergency decrees of 1990. On the constitutional issues of congressional prerogatives, executive power, statism-welfarism, and popular democracy, the nature of the electoral system made a difference. Deputies with more clustered votes tended to be pro-Congress, antiexecutive, supportive of state intervention and welfare, and supportive of popular democracy. These positions resulted, I suggest, from the greater accountability vote clustering produces. Dominant deputies, by contrast, backed the executive and opposed a stronger Congress, and dominance gave deputies the autonomy to dissent from the mainstreams of their parties.

The social characteristics of constituencies did influence congressional voting, though modestly: industrial areas elected more liberal deputies. Overall, however, socioeconomic conditions forged only weak ties between voters and deputies. Brazilian citizens exert pressure for pork-barrel programs, but on broader issues they have little control over their representatives. This should come as no surprise, because no one observing a Brazilian election would feel confident that many voters know anything at all about the positions of their deputies. Ironically, Protestant voters may have the tightest control over their representatives, both in terms of

Ideology played a large role in legislative voting. Former members of the ARENA Party were consistently anti-Congress, proexecutive, antilabor, and lower on support for popular democracy. Deputies with these values clustered in parties supporting President Collor on his decrees, and they were his strongest supporters even within the progovernment parties.

Powerful state governors influenced their delegations in discernible ways. The governor of Bahia cared about constitutional issues, and he polarized his delegation between partisans and opponents. José Sarney, a weaker leader, mobilized his supporters only on the issue of executive strength, but his more conciliatory approach brought him support from opponents in the state as well.

Perhaps the most striking finding was the importance of pork-barrel orientation as a determinant of broader positions. The coefficients of the pork measures are quite large, and the model's explained variance improves substantially when the pork variables are included. In the Constituent Assembly, deputies could be bought or at least rented: deputies receiving public works for their bailiwicks were proexecutive, anti-Congress, antilabor, and low on support for popular democracy. At the beginning of the Collor government pork effects were smaller, partly because the administration was somewhat disorganized and partly because it found other ways to corrupt politicians, but pork-oriented deputies consistently backed the executive. The importance of direct benefits to deputies speaks volumes about the absence of links, on issues of national scope, between voters and their representatives, and it goes far toward explaining the overall weakness of the legislature.

Nonetheless, a reduction in the availability of pork is unlikely to transform the legislature into a paragon of national problem solving. Indeed, if the electoral structure were left unchanged, a shrinkage in pork might prove counterproductive. Currently, the executive builds coalitions by coupling deputies' disinterest in broad policy with their desire for pork.²¹ A reduction in pork would gradually lead to the *replacemnt* in the legislature of pork-oriented deputies. In the absence of programmatic parties, more deputies would rely, by necessity, on ties to "corporatist" organizations, i.e., on ties to groups representing narrow economic interests.²² The resulting legislature might well be more active in the sense that "segmentalist" demands would receive a hearing, but it would also be more conflictual and less responsive to executive guidance.²³

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²¹In work in progress, I am investigating policy making in the legislature. In one case, the 1994 economic stabilization program of the Franco government, the executive branch gained legislative support for its program by extending particularistic benefits to deputies. In the main, the recipients cared little about the stabilization program itself and felt little constituency pressure. See Ames (1994).

²²For a recent work on the importance of "segmental" interests in Brazilian policy-making, see Weyland (1991).

²³More abstractly, one might argue that open-list proportional representation, as it functions in Brazil, encourages the development of undisciplined and unprogrammatic parties both directly,

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through laws such as those guaranteeing incumbents an automatic place on the ballot, and indirectly, by facilitating the election of deputies who have little interest in strong parties and great interest in pork.